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JOINT CRIMINAL TRIALS
. . . the right to a fair trial is the most
fundamental of all rights, for without it
all other rights are mere words, empty
and meaningless.'
During the last decade, various tele-
vision programs have utilized the now col-
loquial "isolation booth." Contestants en-
tered the soundproof booth, and the built-
in speaker system was turned off, leaving
the individual "isolated" from others in
the studio. Whenever two or more criminal
defendants are jointly tried, the jurors are
required to place each in a separate
"isolation booth." They are instructed
that, in determining the guilt or innocence
of defendant A, they must weigh only that
evidence which was admissible against
defendant A, and then isolate and ignore
that portion of the evidence admissible
only against him during their considera-
tion of the guilt or innocence of defendant
B.
The efficacy of this instruction as afford-
ing protection to a defendant in a joint
criminal trial is largely dependent upon
the jury's ability to "isolate" and distin-
guish the evidence educed. An examina-
tion both of the jury's capacity to perform
its assigned function adequately and of
the resultant impact upon the rights of
defendants constitutes the subject matter
of this note.
History of the Joint Trial
At common law, a separate trial was
not numbered among the rights of an in-
dividual who was one of several codefend-
ants jointly indicted for the same crime.2
1 Vanderbilt, The Essentials of a Sound Judicial
System, 48 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1953).
2People v. Vermilyea, 7 Cow. 108, 138 (N.Y.
1827). There is likewise no common-law right
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However, a court could, in its discretion,
grant a separate trial upon the application
of a defendant who feared that a joint
trial would prejudice his defense.3  This
situation prevailed in New York until 1829
when the common-law rule was abrogated.
The statute then enacted provided that
when "two or more defendants shall be
jointly indicted for any felony, any one
defendant requiring it, shall be tried sepa-
rately."4 This standard existed for almost
a century until, in 1926, alleged abuses
of the right to separate trial, as well as
popular demand for more drastic treat-
ment of persons charged with crime,
prompted the New York legislature to
withdraw the absolute right to severance
from a joint criminal defendant.5 Thus,
discretion was once again vested in the
trial judge. The sole criterion by which
the exercise of discretion could be regu-
lated was found in the nebulous caveat
that if facts or circumstances existed which
made it unfair to try the defendants jointly
there would be a reversible abuse.6
on a defendant's part to be tried jointly, and
severance could be had at the instance of the
prosecution. Hoffman v. Commonwealth, 134
Ky. 726, 121 S.W. 690 (1909).
3 5 ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 1944 (1957). It should also be
noted that the "discretion with which the court
is clothed is of course a judicial discretion,
which means that it may not be arbitrarily exer-
cised and that where the circumstances are such
that a defendant will be deprived of a fair trial
if jointly tried, a severance must be ordered."
5 ANDERSON, op. cit. supra (Supp. 1964, at 21);
see also People v. Clark, 17 111. 2d 486, 162
N.E.2d 413 (1959).
4N.Y. REV. STAT. (1829), pt. IV, ch. 2.
5People v. Wargo, 149 Misc. 461, 462, 268
N.Y. Supp. 400, 402 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
6People v. Doran, 246 N.Y. 409, 424, 159
N.E. 379, 384 (1927).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Grounds For Severance
Where the defenses or interests of co-
defendants are antagonistic, severance is
likely to be granted.7  However, it is
necessary that the "antagonism" actually
and presently exist, since the prejudicial
effect must be probable and not merely
possible. Moreover, it must be emphasized
that the existence of a present and prob-
able prejudicial effect does not require
severance as a matter of right. The dis-
cretion of the court still remains the para-
mount factor."
Separate trials may also properly be
granted, where it appears that a defendant
will be substantially prejudiced by the in-
troduction of evidence which is not admis-
sible against him, although it is admissible
against the other defendant(s). 10 How-
ever, severance is not, by any means, the
inevitable result, e.g., were the prosecution
to manifest an intent not to utilize the
evidence, or were the court to decide that,
despite its employment, a jury could be
effectively cautioned concerning its place
in their considerations, then severance
would be denied. 1
The judicial discretion to sever has been
exercised when a motion for severance
was based upon the contention that an-
State v. Progue, 243 La. 337, 144 So. 2d 352
(1962).
s See ibid.; State v. McCarthy, 130 Conn. 96,
31 A.2d 921 (1943).
9 People v. Erno, 195 Cal. 272, 232 Pac. 710
(1925); cf. People v. Aranda, - Cal. 2d-,
47 Cal. Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265 (1965).
"0 People v. Rossi, 270 App. Div. 624, 63
N.Y.S.2d 4 (3d Dep't 1946).
11People v. Santo, 43 Cal. 2d 319, 273 P.2d
249 (1954); State v. Castelli, 92 Conn. 58, 101
AtI. 476 (1917); State v. Rios, 17 N.J. 572,
112 A.2d 247 (1955). But see People v. Aran-
da, supra note 9, at -, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 360-
61, 407 P.2d at 272-73.
other defendant had made a confession
implicating the movant in the commission
of the crime. The majority of jurisdic-
tions have held that the rights and interests
of the non-confessing defendant are ade-
quately protected by an instruction to the
jury that the confession is only referable
to the defendant who made it." This
attitude has been expressed in People v.
Isby,14 where it was asserted that the
exercise of discretion is not abused where
severance is denied in the face of proof
that "damaging testimony, admissible
against one defendant and not against the
other, may be received in the case. .... ,15
Rather, "it is then incumbent upon the
court to limit such evidence in its applica-
tion to the defendant to whom it is refer-
able."6
It is evident, then, that a great burden
is placed upon the defendant; he must
show that the evidence to be adduced is
prejudicial; that it is substantially so; and
that it cannot be outweighed by proper
instructions to the jury. Having surmount-
ed this burden, a defendant still must
await the exercise of the court's discretion,
mindful that:
an appellate court will neither lightly
overrule the trial court in its exercise of
12People v. Feolo, 282 N.Y. 276, 26 N.E.2d
256 (1940); People v. Doran, 246 N.Y. 409,
159 N.E. 379 (1927); People v. Wargo, 149
Misc. 461, 268 N.Y. Supp. 400 (Sup. Ct.
1933); People v. Wood, 306 111. 224, 137 N.E.
799 (1922).
[t3Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232
(1957); Hall v. United States, 168 F.2d 161
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 853 (1948);
People v. Campbell, 301 Mich. 670, 4 N.W.2d
51 (1942).
1430 Cal. 2d 879, 186 P.2d 405 (1947).
1 People v. Isby, 30 Cal. 2d 879, 897, 186
P.2d 405, 416 (1947).
16 ibid.
judicial discretion nor substitute its own
judgment, unless it appears that there has
been a clear abuse of the discretion vested
in the court of original jurisdiction.17
The decisional law would seem to as-
sert that a great deal of faith can reason-
ably be placed in the ability of the jury
to render a decision in accordance with
the court's instructions. But, will the jury
so limit the evidence and "isolate" it from
its consideration of the non-confessing
defendant? Although it can be argued
that a jury will not, in fact, compart-
mentalize the evidence, nevertheless, there
exists a presumption that the jury acts as
it is instructed. In Lindsey v. State,"' it
was argued
that the jury could not consider the con-
fessions for any purpose without consider-
ing them against appellant [the non-con-
fessing defendant]. But this does not
necessarily follow. The jury was told to
do so, and we perceive no reason why
they may not have done it.1a
In a minority of jurisdictions, codefend-
ants are offered severance where the prose-
cution does not agree to withhold the con-
fession or to delete therefrom any refer-
ence to the movant.
20
In all the aforementioned situations, the
propriety of granting severance is neces-
sarily influenced by both the prevalent
17 People v. Diaz, 10 App. Div. 2d 80, 90, 198
N.Y.S.2d 27, 38 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d
1061, 170 N.E.2d 411, 207 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1960).
Is 201 Ark. 87, 183 S.W.2d 573, 577 (1942).
19 Ibid.
20 11 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REV. 251, 253 (1956);
see People v. Aranda, supra note 9, at -, 47
Cal. Rptr. at 361, 407 P.2d at 272. It is sig-
nificant to note that even in jurisdictions where
such severance is not granted, the court will
demand, if possible, that all references to the
codefendant be deleted. Malinski v. New York,
324 U.S. 401 (1945); People v. Vitagliano, 15
N.Y.2d 360, 206 N.E.2d 864, 258 N.Y.S.2d 839
(1965).
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public attitude, and the constitutional re-
quirement of due process imposed on state
criminal procedure.
Public Attitudes Toward Joint Trials
In New York in 1926, the year in which
the "right to severance" statute was re-
pealed, it was felt that the demands of
society for protection from, and immediate
punishment of, the criminal were para-
mount to any in-depth evaluation of the
criminal defendant's individual rights.
21
Judge Hiscock of the New York Court of
Appeals stated that:
there is a general recognition of the fact
that the present prevalence of crime has
outrun the capacity of ordinary institutions
and procedural methods to control it and
that we must have fundamental change
and increase in the observance of the
law .... 22
As a result of this "present prevalence
of crime," it was felt that remedial legisla-
tion was needed. One of the first changes
proposed was a substitution of discretion
in the court for a right in the defendant
whenever severance was sought.2" Indica-
tions of the rationale buttressing this sug-
gested revision may be found in the state-
ment of a public prosecutor:
When a district attorney is compelled to
give separate trials the witnesses become
discouraged because of the loss of time
involved and very often because their
employment is in jeopardy. The cost to
the county is great and it is necessary to
obtain a new panel of jurors for each
trial. The case becomes stale and influ-
ence is used to prevent witnesses who have
appeared at the first trial from appearing
at subsequent trials. 24
21 Hiscock, Criminal Law and Procedure in New
York, 26 COLUM. L. REV. 253 (1926).
22 Id. at 255.
21 Id. at 257.
24 Ibid.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
These arguments favoring substitution of
discretion for a right appear to have been
based solely upon considerations of ex-
pedience. It was recently stated that the
"sole reason which can be advanced for
a joint trial is the economy and expedition
of a single trial. Nothing else!"'25 Even if
it is conceded that other valid grounds
may exist, it appears that vesting the court
with discretion to grant or withhold sever-
ance does not guarantee the defendant a
fair trial, i.e., there is likely to be a sub-
stantial impairment of the rights of a de-
fendant if severance is denied in a felony
prosecution. 2 6 If such be the case, then
"no considerations of expense to the State,
inconvenience to witnesses and public au-
thorities, or even of delay in punishment
of the guilty can justify [such] a pro-
cedure . . ,27
The Jury-Automatons or Men?
In a criminal trial, it is the responsi-
bility of the court to ascertain the effect
of antagonistic defenses, admissions and
confessions upon the movant's right to a
fair trial. If substantial prejudice is prob-
able, severance should and will be granted.
However, the determination of what con-
stitutes substantial prejudice is dependent
upon the abilities which a particular judge
attributes to a jury. It does not seem un-
reasonable to assert that the primary de-
termination-the ultimate factor underly-
ing each decision to grant or deny the
2 -People v. Krugman, 44 Misc. 2d 49, 50, 252
N.Y.S.2d 846, 848 (Sup. Ct. 1964). This case
also sets forth several standards which are sug-
gested for a judge's consideration in determining
whether to grant a motion for severance.
2'3 See People v. Aranda, supra note 9, at
47 Cal. Rptr. at 357-61, 407 P.2d at 268-72.
27People v. Fisher, 249 N.Y. 419, 428, 164
N.E. 336, 339 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
motion for severance-is the presence or
absence on the jury's part of an ability to
"isolate" the defendants in individual men-
tal compartments.
Nevertheless, the proposition has been
advanced that the question of ability to
"isolate" bears no relevance to the discre-
tionary power of the court since
it is a basic premise of our jury system
that the court states the law to the jury
and that the jury applies that law to the
facts as the jury finds them. Unless we
proceed on the basis that the jury will
follow the court's instructions where those
instructions are clear and the circum-
stances are such that the jury can reason-
ably be expected to follow them, the jury
system, makes little sense. 2
In essence, what is claimed is that the
jury, if properly instructed, will be able to
"isolate" the individual defendants, and
if proper instructions for this "mental"
severance cannot be given, then actual
severance will be granted. Thus, the rea-
sonableness of the assumption that a jury
can and will distinguish is put in issue.
In the majority of jurisdictions, wherein
it is believed that the jury can distinguish,
the juror's mind is seen as a tabula rasa
at the inception of the trial. He has no
prejudices, no knowledge of the case. He
has the naked ability to make a reasonable
decision on the facts as presented. When
an improper remark is made, he, upon
the court's admonition, immediately lifts
it from his mind and casts it away. Evi-
dence, admissions and confessions regard-
ing defendant A are immediately placed
in a perfectly sealed compartment from
which nothing leaks into the compartment
28 Delli Paoli v. United States, supra note 13,
at 242.
reserved for defendant B. Naturally, the
result is a fair and objective decision as
to the guilt or innocence of each de-
fendant.
However, it would seem that there is a
more reasonable and valid approach. For
example, Justice Frankfurter, writing for
the four dissenters in Delli Paoli v. United
States,2" asserted that
the fact of the matter is that too often
such admonition [instruction to the jury]
• .. is intrinsically ineffective in that the
effect of such a nonadmissible declaration
cannot be wiped from the brains of the
jurors. The admonition therefore becomes
a futile collocation of words and fails of
its purpose as a legal protection to de-
fendants against whom such a declaration
should not tell.
3 0
This criticism does not stand alone. It has
been enunciated that the maintenance of
a belief that a jury can actually follow
the nonadmissibility instructions is naive."1
Elsewhere, the ability to assimilate and
act upon such instructions has been re-
ferred to as a "mental gymnastic which
is beyond, not only their [the jury's]
powers," but beyond anyone's powers.3"
How can a joint trial, it is queried, fail to
cause a diminution of the safeguards sur-
rounding the defendant's right to a fair
trial, when the jury is "ready to believe
that birds of a feather are flocked to-
21) Delli Paoli v. United States, supra note 13.
I' d. at 247 (dissenting opinion).
31 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440,
453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). The
entire text of the statement referred to is: "The
naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be
overcome by instructions to the jury, all prac-
ticing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."
Ibid.
32 Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007
(2d Cir. 1932).
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gether."1 3 Can the defendant actually be
said to have a fair opportunity to make
his case stand on its own merits in the
minds of these jurors?
The most severe blow dealt to the con-
cept of a juror's ability to properly "iso-
late," was delivered in Krulewitch v. United
States," where it was stated without quali-
fication that the "assumption that preju-
dicial effects can be overcome by instruc-
tions to the jury ...all practising lawyers
know to be unmitigated fiction."35  The
courts adhering to this theory seem to
depict the "average juror" more realistic-
ally-a human being, quite capable of
forming his judgment about the defendants
by means of personal prejudice and asso-
ciation of guilt. Although it would be ideal
to find a juror with a nature as described
by the majority, nevertheless, such a man
-like the "reasonable man"-does not
exist. Thus, in the minority of jurisdic-
tions, the juror's inability to completely
compartmentalize the arguments and proof
brought forth against one defendant is
accepted as it exists in reality.
It is this realistic appraisal of the juror
which, it is submitted, should be formally
adopted. Accepting the fact that the limit-
ing instructions of the court are generally
ineffective, and admitting that, in reality,
a juror does not distinguish, then can it
not be reasonably concluded that a less
fair trial is an inevitable result of a denial
of severance In this era of emphasis on
the protection of individual rights, do the
procedures prevailing in the majority of
jurisdictions satisfy the federal due process
33Krulewitch v. United States, supra note 31,
at 454 (Jackson, J., concurring).
34336 U.S. 440 (1949).
35 Krulewitch v. United States, supra note 31.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
requirements?
Since Powell v. Alabama,36 wherein the
Supreme Court found the denial of de-
fendant's right to counsel a ground to
reverse a state conviction, the Court has
penetratingly construed state criminal pro-
cedure. The Court's primary justification
has been found in the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
Due Process Requirements
With the exception of ex post facto
laws and bills of attainder, 7 the federal
constitution initially placed no limits on
a state's freedom of action with respect to
its criminal procedures. The fourteenth
amendment, enacted in 1868, did not
enumerate specific restrictions, but rather
made use of general terms-terms "cir-
cumscribed by history and appropriate to
the largeness of the problems of govern-
ment with which they were concerned.1 38
Until 1932, in Powell, this amendment
resulted in little interference in state crim-
inal proceedings. However, since that
time, both the scope of the interference
and the scope of the due process clause
itself have been greatly enlarged. Until
recently, the enlargement has consisted for
the most part in balancing what has been
characterized as the "interests of society
pushing in opposite directions. '13 9 In dis-
charging this balancing function, the Court
will "give no ear to the loose talk about
society being 'at war with the criminal'
if by that it is implied that the decencies
of procedure which have been enshrined
36287 U.S. 45 (1932).
37 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
3S Malinski v. New York, supra note 20, at 413
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
39Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171
(1951).
in the Constitution must not be too fas-
tidiously insisted upon in the case of
wicked people."4 Hence, it is not a mere
balancing of wrath against right with which
the Court is concerned, for this would be
intolerable. Rather, it is a balancing of
right against right-that of the state in
furthering its criminal law and procedure,
against that of the federal government in
protecting the rights of its citizens.
It now appears that this balancing ap-
proach has succumbed to a view in which
the state's interest in a certain procedure
has been subordinated to the federal gov-
ernment's interest in the protection of the
individual's rights, provided that there is
an alternative procedure available.
In Jackson v. Denno,41 the United States
Supreme Court reversed a conviction of
first degree murder when the trial judge,
pursuant to the New York procedure,
submitted to the same jury the questions
of the guilt of the defendant and the vol-
untariness of his confession. The Court
held this procedure violative of due pro-
cess in that it denied the defendant the
right to a fair and separate determination
of the voluntariness of his confession. The
conclusion was based on the "psychological
impossibility, inherent in the New York
procedure, for a jury to make a clearly
separate judgment as to guilt or innocence
when the question of coercion was simul-
taneously submitted to it.""4  The Court
added that although this procedure might
not have resulted in a violation each time
employed, nevertheless, it was violative
of due process in that it posed "substantial
40 Malinski v. New York, supra note 20, at 418
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
41 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
42 39 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 138, 142 (1964).
threats to a defendant's constitutional
rights to have an involuntary confession
entirely disregarded. . . -43 The Court
could not bring itself to ignore these
hazards.
44
The concern of the Court was not di-
rected toward a balancing process, but was
concentrated on the "unfairness of the
New York practice, given the availability
of better procedures. '45 Indeed, the Sup-
reme Court has indicated that "a state
criminal procedure may be held to violate
due process not only when it is repugnant
to the 'concept of ordered liberty' or
'shocks the conscience,' but also when it




Since Jackson indicates that a realistic
appraisal of the jury's ability to "isolate"
and "compartmentalize" must result in a
finding that such absolute ability does not
exist, 4 it is apparent that, in a joint felony
trial, with or without instructions, there
exists a substantial threat to the individual
defendant's rights. It is imperative to re-
call that not only will confessions, admis-
sions or silent implications affect the co-
defendant's position, but, in like manner,
4
:
3 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 389 (1964).
(Emphasis added.)
44Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 389 (1964).
45 The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARV.
L REV. 143, 212 (1964).
4, 6Ibid.
4 Supra note 42.
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his very presence as a codefendant may
have an adverse effect upon his right to a
fair trial. Therefore, the substantial threat,
i.e., the taint of a codefendant, inherent
in a joint trial appears to preclude the
rendition of a fair verdict.
Since there is a substantial danger, it
can be logically urged that the mere avail-
ability of a better and fairer procedure
compels its acceptance. 8 It is submitted,
therefore, that the New York provision
for severance in the discretion of the trial
court should be amended with a resultant
restoration of the pre-1926 right to sever-
ance in felony cases.4 9  Naturally, total
mental compartmentalization is not as-
sured. The dangers from publicity would
still exist. However, since this procedure
more effectively shields a criminal defend-
ant from substantial threats to his rights,
it should be adopted.
48 Jackson v. Denno, supra note 44; The Su-
preme Court, 1963 Term, supra note 45.
4'9it may be argued that the special verdict
provision in Section 438 of the New York Code
of Criminal Procedure offers a more practical
vehicle for assuring protection of the individual's
rights. Under this provision, the jury is re-
quested to decide only the facts, and present
them to the court for judgment.
However, it is submitted that the same de-
ficiencies which exist in the joint trial with a
general verdict also exist when a special verdict
is rendered, since, under this procedure, the
arguments made regarding the nature of the
jury's ability to compartmentalize would equally
apply, thus negating any guarantee of absence
of prejudice.
